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Abstract
Error-laden data can negatively affect clinical and
operational decision making, research findings and funding
allocation. This study examined the number and types of data
errors in an electronic medical record (EMR) system in a
Drug and Alcohol service. Specifically, errors in service data
were examined. 9,379 errors were identified from ten error
reports generated between March 2015 and May 2016, three
months after the implementation of the EMR system. These
errors were grouped into four types: mismatched data fields
(60.5%), duplicate medical record error (3.2%), date/time
error (8.8%) and blank field error (27.4%). The errors can be
prevented by adding functions such as alert messages in the
EMR system. How and why the errors occur need to be
investigated in future studies.
Keywords: Electronic Medical Records; Error; Drug and
Alcohol Service

Introduction
The adoption and use of health information systems (HIS)
have made large amount of digital data available for use in
clinical and operational decision making [1], research [2] and
funding allocation [3]. However, data errors may jeopardize
the realisation of these purposes. For example, Ward et al.
found that data errors in HIS time stamp can compromise the
ability of an emergency department to accurately determine its
operational performance [1].
Inherent data errors in clinical research databases may
negatively impact the research findings [4, 5]. In a study
comparing the estimation results of mortality rates using an
error-free database and an error-seeded database, authors
found that the overestimated mortality rates are typical results
of using the latter database [6]. The estimates can be more
than double the true value [6].
Error-laden data can also lead to mis-allocation of healthcare
funding. In a study examing the consequences of miscoding in
a hospital in Australia, authors found that about 16% of
inpatient cases discharged from a specialised surgical unit
during a six-month time period were miscoded. This led to an
approximately $575,000 underpayment to the hospital [3].
Understanding the types and number of errors in an
organization’s HIS is thus useful for managers to develop
strategies to prevent errors. This will ensure that the HIS truly
supports organisational performance measurement, decision
making, research and funding allocation.
Data errors identified by previous studies include time stamp
error [1], miscoding [3], missing data [7], data transfer error
[8], spelling error [9], duplicate records [10, 11], drop-down
menu selection error [10] and inconsistencies between data
fields [12].

Causes of these errors are related to HIS design and how HIS
are used [8]. For example, the drop-down menu selection error
may be caused by too many items in the drop-down list or
items being too close together [13]. Spelling error may be
attributed to healthcare providers documenting in a rush
without proofreading [9].
Alcohol is one of the major risks for both physical and social
health. Excessive consumption of alcohol can cause a wide
range of harms including road accidents, domestic and public
violence, family breakdown, crime, liver disease and brain
damage [14]. Between 2014 and 2015, more than 115,000
Australians received over 170,000 treatment episodes from
publicly-funded Drug and Alcohol (D&A) service [15].
In 2013, the public health in New South Wales (NSW),
Australia moved from lump-sum funding of D&A services to
funding based on treatment activities. The effectiveness of this
new model of funding is substantially relied on the precision
of data recorded in a HIS. Inaccurate recording may not only
affect the amount of funding allocated to a D&A service, but
also the managerial decisions made using this data, for
example in policy making, service planning, research and
education [16]. To our knowledge, however, no study has
investigated the precision of D&A service data under this
model of funding.
Therefore, this study aimed to investigate the number and
types of errors in service data in a D&A service in NSW,
Australia.

Methods
Study setting
This study was conducted in a D&A service in NSW,
Australia.
Data source
An electronic medical record (EMR) system was implemented
in December 2014. Service activity data were extracted by
performance unit staff from the EMR system and uploaded to
Web Non-Admitted Patient (WebNAP), a system that reported
outpatient activities to NSW Ministry of Health for use in state
health policy decision making including funding.
The WebNAP system matched the uploaded activity data with
its predefined activity classification. When the data did not
match the classification, the WebNAP system identified an
error and automatically recorded it in an error report. For
example, the WebNAP activity classification showed that
D&A was a community service, therefore D&A healthcare
providers should always choose community as their setting
type. If a provider chose hospital, an error occurred.

Datasets
Ten error reports generated between March 2015 and May
2016, three to 14 months after implementation of the system,
were provided by the information manager in the D&A
service. This relates to approximately 150,000 records per
year for 60,000 patients. On past experience, errors would be
expected in 7% of the records with more than one error in 2%
of these.
An error report contains the following data fields in an excel
spreadsheet: clinic name, healthcare worker’s name, client
name, client medical record number, error description,
appointment date/time, service date/time, referral date/time,
referral receipt date/time, service type, provider type, setting
type, modality of care, financial class, Department of
Veterans' Affairs (DVA) card type and DVA card number.
Names of healthcare workers and clients were deidentified to
maintain confidentiality.
Data analysis
Data on error description was extracted for analysis by the
researchers. The errors are labelled based on the feedback
from the WebNAP system and were further grouped to higher
level categories. The number of each type of error was
counted.
Ethics approval
Ethics approval to conduct this study was granted by the joint
Health and Medical Human Research Ethics Committee of the
University of Wollongong and the Illawarra & Shoalhaven
Local Health District. Access to the error reports was granted
by the service manager of the D&A service. Consent was
obtained from healthcare providers for their error reports to be
used in this study.

Results
Types of Errors in D&A Service Data
The identified errors were grouped into four types:
‘mismatched data fields’, ‘duplicate record’, ‘date/time error’
and ‘blank field’ (see Table 1).
There were two types of ‘mismatched data fields’. One was
‘service option error’ and the other was ‘DVA information
error’. ‘Service option error’ occurred when one of the three
data entry fields- provider type, modality of care and setting
type- did not match what was set up in the WebNAP
classification. Provider type described the job role of a
healthcare provider e.g. a registered nurse, a psychologist or a
counsellor. Modality of care was the means for delivery of a
service e.g. telephone, email or face-to-face meeting between
a healthcare provider or a group of healthcare providers and a
client. Setting type was the location where the service was
provided e.g. hospital, community or home.
The ‘DVA information error’ occurred when the information
provided in the two data entry fields - DVA card details and
financial classification - did not match with each other. There
were two situations. One was ‘DVA card details supplied but
financial classification is not DVA’ and the other was
‘financial classification is DVA but missing DVA card
details’.
‘Duplicate medical record’ occurred when more than one
encounter was created for a client in the EMR system.
However, a client could only have one active encounter at a
time.
The ‘date/time error’ was related to referral date/time, referral
receipt date/time, service start date/time and service end

date/time. These date/times include time information. The
logical order of these date/times must be as follows: the
referral date/time should be earlier than the referral receipt
date/time which should be earlier than the service start
date/time and the service end date/time. When this order was
turned around, an error occurred.
The last data error type was ‘blank field’ which occurred when
a data entry field was blank. The identified blank fields were
provider type, funding source, financial classification and
address fields including post code, suburb and street.
Table 1– Number and types of errors in service data in the
EMR system in a D&A service.
Error types

Number

%

Total

9379

100

Mismatched data fields
Service option error (provider type,
modality of care or setting type does
not match what is in WebNAP classification.)
*DVA information error (DVA card
details supplied but financial classification is not DVA, or financial
classification is DVA but missing
DVA card details)

5675
5650

60.5
60.2

25

0.3

Duplicate medical record
A second encounter is created in the
EMR, but a client can only have one
active encounter at a time

303

3.2

Date/time error
Service start date/time is after service
end date/time
Referral receipt date/time is after service date/time or before referral
date/time
Referral date/time is after service start
date/time

834
591

8.8
6.3

145

1.5

98

1

Blank field
Blank provider type

2567
2473

27.4
26.4

Blank post code

36

0.4

Blank suburb

21

0.2

Blank street

21

0.2

Blank funding source code

10

0.1

Blank financial classification

6

0.1

*DVA: Department of Veterans' Affairs
Number of Errors in Each Error Type
Overall, 9,379 errors were identified from the error reports
(see Table 1). 60.5% of the errors were ‘mismatched data
fields’, of which majority was ‘service option error’. 27.4%
were ‘blank field’ with ‘blank provider type’ being the error
that occurred most frequently. ‘Date/time error’ accounted for
8.8% of the total number of errors. ‘Service start date/time is
after service end date/time’ was the major error which
accounted for 6.3%. ‘Duplicate medical record’ was the least
frequently occurring error which accounts for 3.2% of the total
errors.

Discussion
As errors in operational data can be pervasive in the
immediate period after the implementation of HIS [7], this
study focused on analysing error reports for an EMR system
three to 14 months after its implementation. The large amount
of errors found in this study may be due to the learning curve
of healthcare providers. Further study will investigate trend in
data errors over time.
We classified errors into four types. This is useful for
investigating causes of error and developing different
prevention and mitigation strategies required for different
error types.
Causes of these errors might be related to the EMR system
design issue, how the system was used, the environment in
which it was used or a combination of them. For example, this
study found that ‘service option error’ was the most common
error in the D&A service data and wrong selection of ‘setting
type’ was one immediate reason for it. In the WebNAP
reporting system, the D&A service was mapped as a
community setting. That means all healthcare providers
working in the D&A service must select ‘community’ for
setting type, regardless where the service was provided. This
would ensure that funding was allocated to D&A service.
Some of the healthcare providers, although employed to work
for the D&A service, were responsible for providing this
specialist service in a hospital setting. A D&A healthcare
provider might select ‘hospital’ for the setting type, because
he or she provided the service there. This would result in a
‘service option error’ because the setting type of ‘hospital’
was not mapped in the WebNAP system for the D&A service.
If this error was not corrected, funding would be misplaced to
the hospital setting, instead of D&A service.
The term ‘setting type’ may confuse healthcare providers,
especially new employees, on whether it means the location of
service provided or the healthcare service by which the
healthcare provider was employed. This could be one reason
for the error to occur.
Another reason might be the design issue of the WebNAP
system. The system used ‘setting type’ to determine which
healthcare service would get funding. Actually, it could have
used the information about the healthcare service by which the
healthcare provider was employed to determine the correct
‘setting type’. This suggested that the system designer did not
really understand how healthcare providers worked and how
funding was allocated. Extraction of correct data elements
would eliminate the error and ensure correct funding
allocation.
A mix of system design issue and the environmental condition
under which end users use the system may contribute to the
occurrence of error. This study found that ‘date/time error’
accounted for almost 9% of the total number of errors.
Date/time data were required from three forms that D&A
healthcare providers used in the EMR system: intake form,
assessment form and clinical note. The intake form was used
when a client first contacted the D&A service. The assessment
form was used to assess the person after intake. The clinical
note was used in the subsequent visits of the client. The entire
journey of the person with the D&A service from intake to
discharge is an ‘encounter’. Each contact of the person with
the D&A service may contain serveral ‘services’, e.g.
counselling, rehabilitation or supervised medication
administration. The three forms were used at different stages
of the encounter. The intake form and the assessment form
were used in the beginning of this encounter. The clinical note
was used multiple times until the closure of the encounter.

Within each form, the service start date/time must be before
the service end date/time. However, the way to record service
start and end date/time is different among the three forms (see
Table 2). The intake form automatically populated service
start date/time from the computer, but required healthcare
providers to manually enter end date/time. The assessment
form required both start and end date/time to be manually
entered. The clinical note required a manual entry of start
date/time, but automatically filled in the end date/time. This
mixed ways of recording date/time opens opportunities for
error.
Another reason for the error to occur might be the
environmental condition under which healthcare providers
recorded data. Sitting with a client and recording data in a
computer at the same time may increase the probablity of
making error. Automatic time recording may have better data
accuracy than manual time recording [17]. A check of
date/time by the EMR system at the data entry stage may also
help to prevent the erroneous data from being recorded.
Table 2– How service start and end date/time is recorded.
Forms

Service start
date/time

Service end
date/time

Intake form

Auto-populated, can Manually entered
be adjusted manually

Assessment
form

Manually entered

Manually entered

Clinical note

Manually entered

Auto-populated, can
be adjusted manually

A lack of alert message function in the system may open
opportunity for error. For example, although the percentage of
‘duplicate medical record’ is not high in this study, duplicate
records can mislead healthcare providers in clinical decision
making because they may miss important information that
exists in a different record [11]. This error may also cause
confusion in information retrieval [18]. Disruptive pop-up
alert message [4] built into an EMR system may help to
decrease this error.
The ‘blank provider type’ is the second common error found
in this study. This error might be caused by system
dysfunction. It may also be due to the inability of the system
administrator to keep up with the workload of correctly
mapping the providers in the WebNAP system–because of the
high turnover of D&A staff, or lack of information on changes
in roles for staff members or new staff in the service. Further
study is needed to investigate how and why this error
occurred.
Since the service data were first extracted by the performance
unit staff before submitting to WebNAP, it was possible that
the errors reported in this study could also be injected during
the process of data extraction.
With the increased use of EMR, research using EMR data has
been prospering, for example in EMR phenotyping [19],
clinical workflow modelling [20] and disease prediction [21].
The strength of evidence from the secondary analysis of EMR
data can be hindered by errors contained in these data [4, 5].
In the case mentioned in the introduction section, the study
comparing the estimation results of mortality rates using an
error-free database and an error-seeded database, the analysis
result using the error-laden data was more than double the true
results using the error-free data [6]. This shows the negative
impact of erroneous data in reducing accuracy of data

analytics and lead to invalid findings. Therefore, data errors
and their causes need to be identified, reduced or eliminated to
ensure high data quality to provide accurage evidence for
research and health decision making [22].

[4]

Limitation

[5]

We did not analyse all the error reports generated after the
implementation of the EMR system. This was because there
was no health information manager at the D&A service for a
period of three months. Consequently no error reports were
downloaded in this period. However, the errors made during
that time period rolled over to the following months’ reports,
so we think that we had all errors analysed. Directly
interviewing the healthcare providers who made the errors
would give further insights about the reasons for the errors
made, which would be beneficial for learning to prevent errors
in the EMR system.

[6]

[7]

[8]

Conclusion
Error-laden data can jeopardize clinical and operational
decision making [1], research findings [6] and funding
allocation [3]. To manage errors, it is paramount for D&A
service to understand the nature and extent of error and the
environment that induce error [23].
This study investigated the number and types of errors in
service data in a D&A service. The identified errors were
grouped into four error types: ‘mismatched data fields’
(60.5%), ‘duplicate medical record’ (3.2%), ‘date/time error’
(8.8%) and ‘blank field’ (27.4%). The top three most frequent
sub errors were ‘service option error’, ‘blank provider type’
and ‘service start date/time is after service end date/time’. The
results from this study underscore the importance of
understanding errors in EMR data. Further study will
investigate the trend in data errors overtime and how and why
errors occur in the EMR system.

[9]

[10]

[11]

[12]
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